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ABSTRACT 
Consider a set of points and an associated demand for traffic between each pair of points. 
In this thesis, we consider the perspective of a notional Network Service Provider (NSP) 
who has to decide on the connections to build and the demands to satisfy in order to 
maximize its profits. The NSP makes these decisions based on the demand for 
connectivity and the constraints on their resources needed to provide the connections. We 
perform numerical experiments to study the tensions faced by the NSP in its decisions to 
structure its service network. Through the results generated, we infer how demand, 
revenue and cost influence the decisions of the NSP. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
A network is a system of entities, called nodes, that are connected together to perform a 
service. We refer to the connections as arcs or links. The network service typically 
involves the exchange of information, physical goods, or other commodities. 
Many systems that affect our daily lives rely upon networks in order to function. 
For example, the Internet is the fundamental global information structure, a critical 
element in the interactions between people, businesses and other organizations. Many 
civilian and military systems are dependent on it to function. 
Over the last decade, there has been considerable effort devoted to understanding 
the structure and function of many different types of networks. Much of this effort has 
focused on graph connectivity properties and random generation mechanisms that give 
rise to them. However, there can be many generation mechanisms that give rise to the 
same network structure. Thus, the ability of a model to produce connectivity statistics 
similar to those in the real world does not by itself prove that the model explains that real 
system.  
The Internet provides an interesting case study, where simple models of 
preferential attachment have been argued to be the cause of power-law distributions in 
network connectivity. A closer look at the details of the real Internet reveals the specious 
nature of these models and argues instead for models of network formation that capture 
the economic and technical drivers of real network growth. 
In this thesis, we consider the perspective of a notional Network Service Provider 
(NSP) who has to decide on the connections to build and the demands to satisfy in order 
to maximize its profits. The NSP makes these decisions based on the demand for 
connectivity and the constraints on their resources needed to provide the connections. We 
model the decisions of the NSP, through a traffic engineering model and a network 
provisioning model, and we perform numerical experiments to study the tensions faced 
by the NSP in its decisions to structure its service network. 
 xvi
We make use of the Abilene dataset as input to the network provisioning model 
and assume that the NSP is new to the market and is building an entirely new network. 
Our model includes two types of costs: fixed costs for building new arcs and 
variable costs for adding capacity to the arcs. When there are no fixed costs associated 
with building new arcs, we see that flows of commodities are through direct arcs, which 
are the least costly to transport the commodities. We also identify that the priority is to 
build arcs to satisfy the demand of the commodity with the greatest marginal profit. If the 
marginal profit for a commodity is negative, the direct arc will not be built. This gives a 
simple greedy algorithm heuristic.  
When we introduce fixed costs, the flows of commodities are no longer 
necessarily via direct arcs. Even when the fixed costs are low, we observe that there are 
commodities that are not transported even though the network has capacity to do so. By 
increasing the marginal revenue for the unfulfilled demand, we can make it profitable for 
the NSP to service that demand. We also illustrate a case where increasing marginal 
revenue leads to a new network construction that also reduces the costs of servicing other 
demands. 
We generalize the results in a network provisioning decision rule that provides a 
simple heuristic of constructing the NSP’s network. We observe that when fixed costs get 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
A network is a system of entities, called nodes, that are connected together to 
perform a service. We refer to the connections as arcs or links. A network service 
typically involves the exchange of information, physical goods, or other commodities 
over the shared network. 
Many systems that affect our daily lives rely upon networks in order to function. 
For example, the Internet is the fundamental global information structure, a critical 
element in the interactions between people, businesses and other organizations. Many 
civilian and military systems are dependent on it to function. 
Over the last decade, there has been considerable effort devoted to understanding 
the structure and function of many different types of networks, (e.g., Newman, Barabási, 
and Watts, 2007; Newman, 2003; and Dorogovtsev and Goltsev, 2008). Much of this 
effort has focused on graph connectivity properties and random generation mechanisms 
that give rise to them. 
However, there can be many generation mechanisms that give rise to the same 
network structure. Thus, the ability of a model to produce connectivity statistics similar 
to those in the real world does not by itself prove that the model explains that real system. 
The internet provides an interesting case study, where simple models of preferential 
attachment have been argued to be the cause of power-law distributions in network 
connectivity (Barabási and Albert, 1999). But a closer look at the details of the real 
Internet reveals the specious nature of these models and argues instead for models of 
network formation that capture the economic and technical drivers of real network 
growth (Alderson, Li, Willinger, and Doyle, 2005; Alderson, 2008; Willinger, Alderson 
and Doyle, 2009). 
In this thesis, we consider the perspective of a notional Network Service Provider 
(NSP) who has to decide on the connections to build and the markets to serve in order to 
maximize its profits. The NSP makes these decisions based on the market demand for 
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connectivity and the constraints on available resources to provide the connections. These 
demands and resource constraints will vary by environment; hence, the resultant 
networks formed may also vary. 
In particular, this thesis looks into the following question: How does a Network 
Service Provider decide to which locations it should provide connectivity? 
We build simple models and perform numerical experiments to study the tensions 
faced by the NSP in its decisions to build its service network. Our results allow us to infer 
how demand, revenue and cost influence the decisions of the NSP. 
B. RELATED WORK 
Understanding the decisions of a NSP touches on several important topics. 
1. Network Design Problem 
In the network design problem, the network planner decides how to connect nodes 
to form a network and how to route the traffic through the network in order to satisfy 
performance criteria such as cost, capacity and resiliency. Much research has been 
conducted in the fields of Telecommunications and Transportation.  
In the field of telecommunications, Resende and Pardalos (2006) cover a wide 
range of topics on the use of optimization techniques in the design of telecommunications 
networks. In particular, Forsgren and Prytz (2006) cover the important classes of network 
design problems, and they discuss solution strategies to these classes of problems using 
optimization models.  
Lederer and Nambimadom (1998) study the effect of distance, demand rate and 
number of cities served on the performance of four types of airline networks for a profit 
maximizing airline, and they report that each type of network can be optimal for selected 
parameters. 
In this thesis, the NSP essentially is posed with the network design problem, and 
we formulate an optimization-based model to capture the essential features which affect 
the NSP’s decision. 
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2. Network Economics 
Network Economics is the field that analyzes the provision, distribution and 
utilization of services through a network. In the context of networks, economists are 
interested in the important factors determining what services are offered, and how they 
are priced to give incentive to the provider to offer that service.  
Relating back to the network design problem, the services offered manifest in the 
form of commodity flows in the network – if a commodity is serviced, there must be a 
non-zero flow of that commodity through the network, and this implies that at least one 
path must exist between the origin of the commodity, and the destination of the 
commodity. 
Economides (2008) notes that a fundamental property of networks is that they 
exhibit network externalities. The presence of positive network externalities signifies that 
the value of a unit of the good increases with the number of units sold. This gives rise to 
the presence of network effects, a unique feature in the context of economics, whereby 
the value of a connection to a network increases with the size of the network. He also 
covers in detail the consequences of network effects on the market structure in network 
industries. 
Odlyzko (2004) presents a discussion of the evolution of pricing in early 
transportation industries, and shows that price discrimination is an important factor in the 
development of those industries. He uses these historical precedents to explain the 
behavior of the telecommunications industry, and explores the implications for the 
evolution of the internet. 
Zhang, Nabipay, Odlyzko and Guerin (2010) present an economic model for 
studying competition and innovation in a complex system of network providers, users 
and service providers. The model combines Cournot and Bertrand games to model 
competition among the service providers and network providers respectively. The service 
providers determine the optimal amount of services to offer to meet demand, while the 
network providers determine the optimal price to charge the service providers. 
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In this thesis, the results generated based on our models tell us the connections or 
services offered. Through the variation of input parameters to the model, we also observe 
the impact of pricing of the services. 
3. Models of Network Formation as a Game 
Fabrikant et al. (2003) propose a network formation game called the Unilateral 
Connection Game (UCG) that models the creation of networks by selfish acting nodes 
without coordination. Each node is a player, and a player’s strategy is the choice of the 
subset of nodes to which it wants to form a connection with through an arc. In the UCG, 
an arc is formed either of the incident nodes’ strategies contain that arc. 
Corbo and Parks (2005) describe an extension of the UCG called the Bilateral 
Connection Game (BCG). Similar to the UCG, the players of the BCG are also nodes. In 
the BCG, however, an arc is formed only if both incident nodes’ strategies contain that 
arc. Any connection cost is shared equally between the two nodes. 
The UCG and BCG can be considered forms of the Local Connection Game 
(Tardos & Wexler, 2007). In contrast, in a Global Connection Game (Tardos & Wexler, 
2007), each player has a specified source node and sink node, and the goal for each 
player is to build a path from his source node to sink node while paying as little as 
possible to do so. Costs on an arc are shared by the number of players whose paths 
contains that arc. 
McPherson (2009) contrasts networks that grow randomly with those that result 
from design. The probabilistic graph formation models include the classic Erdős-Rényi 
models, geometric random graphs and preferential attachment models. Using the 
minimum spanning tree problem as the basis, the behavior of the random models are 
contrasted with optimization-based models that deliberately grow network structure to 
achieve a stated performance objective. 
In our thesis, the player is not constrained to a single source and destination node 
pair, but instead considers a collection of source nodes and destination nodes to build 
paths to derive the highest possible profit.  
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4. Models of Internet Design 
Derosier (2008) compares heuristics and optimization-based approaches to the 
design of Internet Service Provider (ISP) network topologies. He infers the underlying 
key design principle from observing and reverse-engineering a national ISP, and develops 
heuristics and optimization models to generate ISP networks based on the observations of 
the national ISP. He then compares the performance of the networks created from using 
the heuristic models and the optimization models, using cost and throughput as 
performance measures. 
Sanchez (2010) develops a traffic engineering model, a network provisioning 
model and a multi-period network provisioning model for the ISP whose objective is to 
minimize cost. Through experiments using the three models, he focuses on explaining the 
factors that lead to changes in network performance and extracts investment policies for 
ISPs to maximize the effectiveness of limited resources over a multi-period planning 
horizon. 
Adopting a similar approach, we develop optimization models framed in the 
economics of a notional NSP who is motivated by profits. Through numerical 
experiments using these models, we attempt to gain insight on the effects of changes in 
values of input parameters. 
C. STRUCTURE OF THESIS AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
In this thesis, we formulate an optimization-based model that focuses on network 
design. To incorporate economic drivers in the model, we endow the NSP with a profit 
maximizing motive, and include elements of cost and revenue in the objective function 
and the constraints. We then perform numerical experiments to identify the impact of 
changes in the input parameters. Through the experiments, we illustrate the tensions 
faced by the NSP in deciding which demands to satisfy in the face of revenue and cost. 
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II. MODELLING THE GROWTH OF A SINGLE NSP 
A. MODELING THE NSP NETWORK 
We assume the main drivers of the growth of a network are the demand from 
customers, cost of providing links, the revenue generated from fulfilling demand, and the 
capacity of the links. The NSP has to decide which demands to satisfy and how to route 
the commodities in order to receive maximum revenue. When given the ability to 
enhance the network, the NSP also has to decide if it makes economic sense to invest in 
enhancements to derive more profits. 
In an unconstrained environment, we expect that a NSP will grow to obtain more 
customers provided that the marginal cost of servicing them is less than the marginal 
revenue. However, we identify three main factors that can also restrict the growth of the 
service network. 
1. All demands are satisfied. 
2. The budget for network expansion is exhausted. 
3. The maximum capacities of critical links are reached. 
In this thesis, we focus on routing commodities in order to maximize profit. The 
models introduced here belong to the general class of multi-commodity flow models. 
B. NOTATION 
In this thesis, we adopt the notation and conventions in Ahuja, Magnanti, and 
Orlin (1993).  Let N be a set of nodes, each representing a city that can potentially be 
connected in the NSP network. We define a path as a sequence of nodes in a network 
without repetition. Here, a node can correspond to the origin, intermediate point, or 
destination along a particular path. Let 1, 2,...,n N  index set N. Aliases for n include i, 
j, s and t. The set A N N   represents the set of arcs that connect nodes in a network. 
We use ( , )i j  to denote a directed arc from node i to node j. 
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C. THE DEMAND MATRIX 
The demand between each source and destination city can be summarized in the 
form of the Origin-Destination (O-D) demand matrix. We use the gravity model 
(Roughan, 2005) to generate the demand matrix. This is the same method for the 
synthesis of the demand matrices adopted in Sanchez (2010). The gravity model is 
conceptually similar to Newton’s law of gravitation. The key idea in the gravity model is 
that the demand for network traffic between two cities is proportional to the product of 
their customer populations. 
1. The Gravity Model 
Let stb  be the demand for service for commodities from origin s bound for 
destination t. Let ( )p i  be the population of city i in millions of people. Let i  be the 
proportion of population that desires to be serviced. Then the customer population for 
city i is ( )i p i . 
The general formulation for the demand between two cities s and t is 
( ) ( )t s ts p s tb p  , where ( )s p s  is the customer population at origin city s, and ( )t p t  
is the customer population at destination city t. 
D. TRAFFIC ENGINEERING TO MAXIMIZE PROFIT 
We first consider a single NSP whose objective is to maximize its revenue 
through routing commodities from source node s  to destination node t  to satisfy the 
demand, given constraints on the network. The constraints appear in the form of 
maximum load capacities that each arc can carry. We assume that the network topology 
is given and that the NSP knows the demand matrix. We also assume that there is no cost 
associated with routing the commodity over any existing arcs. 
The NSP generates revenue from each unit of commodity ( , )s t  delivered, which 
we denote as stQ . Let st represent the revenue generated per unit of commodity ( , )s t . 
The NSP has to decide how to route each commodity ( , )s t  through a path in the network 
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connecting s  and t . Let stijX  represent the amount of commodity ( , )s t  routed over arc 
( , )i j . There is also a capacity limit ijcap , which denotes the maximum amount of total 
flow that can be carried over arc ( , )i j . We assume that stQ  is also limited by the demand 
stb .  
We formulate the Traffic Engineering (TE) model as follows: 
Sets 
N Nodes 
A Directed Arcs A N N   
Index Use 
n N  Index of Node (alias i, j, s, t) 
( , )i j A  Directed Arcs from node i to node j 
Parameters [units] 
st  Revenue per unit of commodity delivered between source node s and 
destination node t [$/Gbps] 
ijcap  Existing capacity over arc ( , )i j [Gbps] 
stb  Demand between source node s and destination node t [Gbps] 
Decision Variables [units] 
st
ijX  Quantity of commodity from source node s and destination node t 
routed on arc ( , )i j  [Gbps] 
stQ  Quantity of commodity from source node s delivered to destination 




 ) [Gbps] 
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Formulation (Traffic Engineering) 
Discussion 
The objective function (TE0) gives the total revenue generated by the NSP, which 
we compute from the amount of commodity actually delivered and the revenue for each 
unit of commodity delivered. Constraints (TE1) ensure the balance of commodity flow at 
every node n. Constraints (TE2) ensure that the commodity flow along every arc ( , )i j  
does not exceed the available capacity. Constraints (TE3) ensure that the amount of 
commodity does not exceed the amount demanded. Constraints (TE4) ensure the network 
flows are nonnegative. Constraints (TE5) ensure that the demands fulfilled are 
nonnegative. 
E. NETWORK PROVISIONING TO MAXIMIZE PROFIT 
Next, we consider the case where the NSP is given a budget to enhance the 
capacity of the network, potentially allowing it to generate more profit. The NSP can do 
so by increasing the capacity of existing arcs or by building additional arcs where none 
previously existed.  
We assume that increasing the capacity of existing arcs incurs a variable cost, 
while building additional arcs incurs both the variable cost and a fixed cost. The NSP 
now decides which option to take on each of the arcs ( , )i j . However, there is also a 




. . , , , ( 1)
0,
( , ) ( 2)
, ( 3)
0 ( , ) , , ( 4)
0 , ( 5)




j N i N
st
ij ij







s t X X Q n t n s t N TE
otherwise
X cap i j A TE
Q b s t N TE
X i j A s t N TE






          
  
  






The Network Provisioning (NP) model builds upon the Traffic Engineering 
model, with the following modifications: 
Additional Parameters [units] 
ij  Cost per unit distance per unit of additional capacity provided over arc 
( , )i j  [$/Gbps/unit distance] 
ij   Fixed cost of building new arc ( , )i j [$] 
ijd  Distance between node i and node j [unit distance] 
budget  Total budget given to enhance capacity of network [$] 
ijmaxcap  Maximum capacity over arc ( , )i j  [Gbps] 
Derived Data 
( , )
_ _ min{ | 0}ij iji j Amin pos cap cap cap   
Additional Decision Variables [units] 
ijY  Additional capacity provided between node i and node j [Gbps] 
ijV  Binary variable {0,1}, 1 if new arc ( , )i j  is built, and 0 otherwise 
[binary] 
ijR  Binary variable {0,1}, 1 if arc ( , )i j  exists, and 0 otherwise [binary] 
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Formulation (Network Provisioning) 
Discussion 
The objective function (NP0) is the extension of (TE0) which gives the profit 
generated by also considering the costs incurred for the expansion of the network. 
Constraints (NP1) ensure that the commodity flow along each arc ( , )i j  does not exceed 
the enhanced capacity of the arc. Constraint (NP2) ensures that the costs do not exceed 
the budget. Constraints (NP3) ensure that the enhanced capacity does not exceed the 
maximum capacity allowable over arc ( , )i j  when arc ( , )i j  exists. Constraints (NP4) 
force ijR  to value 1 for arc ( , )i j  when there is any capacity on the arc. Constraints (NP5) 
force ijR  to value 0 for arc ( , )i j  when there is no capacity on the arc and the arc is not 
built. Constraints (NP6) ensure symmetry between arcs built. Constraints (NP7) ensure 
that additional arc capacity on any arc is nonnegative. Constraints (NP8) and (NP9) 
ensure that ijV  and ijR  are binary variables. 
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When Y , V , and R are fixed and feasible, the NP model reduces to traffic 
engineering on the resultant enhanced network incorporating Y , V , and R . Also note 
that when 0budget  , the Network Provisioning model is the same as the Traffic 
Engineering model. This is because when 0budget  , 0ijY   and 0ijV   for all arcs 
( , )i j . When 0ijY  , constraints (NP1) are the same as constraints (TE2), and constraint 
(NP0) is the same as constraint (TE0). Then, constraints (NP3), (NP4) and (NP5) are 
unnecessary as ijR  does not affect the objective function constraint (NP0). 
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III.  NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS 
In this chapter, we conduct numerical experiments to derive key insights from the 
Network Provisioning model. We first give an overview of the underlying data, and 
present the input parameters to our model. We then solve a sample traffic engineering 
problem, and through the presentation of the result, we introduce some useful 
visualization and interpretation aids. We then present the results of the application of the 
Network Provisioning models with select input parameters. For some key results, we 
offer explanation on the underlying reason for the results. 
We implement the models using the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS, 
2011), and use CPLEX as the solver on a personal notebook computer with an Intel 
CORE i5 CPU at 2.53 GHz. The runtimes to generate the solutions vary from a few 
seconds in cases without fixed costs, and up to thirty minutes when fixed costs are 
included. 
A. THE ABILENE NETWORK 
Abilene is a high-speed research and education network providing Internet 
services to universities throughout the United States. The network is used by hundreds of 
universities in the United States for services such as “tele-immersion, virtual laboratories, 
distance learning, distributed performing arts, tele-medicine, grid computing and digital 
libraries” (Qwest, 2011). 
The topology of the Abilene network (Qwest, 2011) is shown in Figure 1.  
Abilene has Points of Presence (POPs) in 11 cities throughout the United States, 
connected via 28 arcs, each with 10 Gbps of capacity. 
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Figure 1.   Abilene Topology (From Qwest, 2011). 
The topology of the Abilene network is well documented, but the O-D demand 
matrices are unknown. Feeding the customer population data shown in Table 1 into the 
gravity model (Roughan, 2005) described in Chapter II, we generate the O-D demand 
matrix in Table 2.  Summing across all entries in Table 2, the total demand from all the 
nodes is 34.866 Gbps.  
Table 3 shows the nominal distances used in the computation in this thesis. Each 
nominal distance value is the Euclidean distance computed based on the latitude and 




Table 1.   Population and assumed customer population of the 11 cities with POPs in 
the Abilene network; Population data from U.S. Census Bureau (2011) 





Atlanta ATL 0.50 0.16 
Chicago CHI 2.90 0.93 
Denver DEN 0.60 0.19 
Houston HOU 2.20 0.70 
Indianapolis IND 0.80 0.26 
Kansas City KSC 0.50 0.16 
Los Angeles LAX 3.80 1.22 
New York NYC 8.40 2.69 
Seattle SEA 0.60 0.03 
Sunnyvale SUN 0.10 0.19 
Washington DC WDC 0.60 0.19 
 
Table 2.   Abilene O-D demand matrix based on gravity model, using the customer 
population data in Table 1.  The units of demand are in Gbps. 
 ATL CHI DEN HOU IND KSC LAX NYC SEA SUN WDC 
ATL - 0.148 0.031 0.113 0.041 0.026 0.195 0.430 0.031 0.005 0.031 
CHI 0.148 - 0.178 0.653 0.238 0.148 1.128 2.494 0.178 0.030 0.178 
DEN 0.031 0.178 - 0.135 0.049 0.031 0.233 0.516 0.037 0.006 0.037 
HOU 0.113 0.653 0.135 - 0.180 0.113 0.856 1.892 0.135 0.023 0.135 
IND 0.041 0.238 0.049 0.180 - 0.041 0.311 0.688 0.049 0.008 0.049 
KSC 0.026 0.148 0.031 0.113 0.041 - 0.195 0.430 0.031 0.005 0.031 
LAX 0.195 1.128 0.233 0.856 0.311 0.195 - 3.269 0.233 0.039 0.233 
NYC 0.430 2.494 0.516 1.892 0.688 0.430 3.269 - 0.516 0.086 0.516 
SEA 0.031 0.178 0.037 0.135 0.049 0.031 0.233 0.516 - 0.006 0.037 
SUN 0.005 0.030 0.006 0.023 0.008 0.005 0.039 0.086 0.006 - 0.006 
WDC 0.031 0.178 0.037 0.135 0.049 0.031 0.233 0.516 0.037 0.006 - 
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Table 3.   Distance Matrix for cities in Abilene. The distances are in nominal units 
calculated from the Euclidean distance based on the latitudes and longitudes 
of the nodes. 
 ATL CHI DEN HOU IND KSC LAX NYC SEA SUN WDC 
ATL - 8.86 21.34 11.53 6.36 11.76 33.98 12.64 40.32 38.17 9.03 
CHI 8.86 - 17.35 14.20 2.57 7.53 31.77 13.72 35.09 34.99 11.04 
DEN 21.34 17.35 - 13.65 18.60 10.16 14.73 30.91 19.06 17.64 27.85 
HOU 11.53 14.20 13.65 - 13.33 9.37 23.39 23.94 32.12 28.09 20.35 
IND 6.36 2.57 18.60 13.33 - 8.46 32.65 12.33 36.85 36.17 9.27 
KSC 11.76 7.53 10.16 9.37 8.46 - 24.29 20.79 28.75 27.71 17.69 
LAX 33.98 31.77 14.73 23.39 32.65 24.29 - 44.94 14.07 5.43 41.65 
NYC 12.64 13.72 30.91 23.94 12.33 20.79 44.94 - 48.78 48.50 3.61 
SEA 40.32 35.09 19.06 32.12 36.85 28.75 14.07 48.78 - 9.83 46.07 
SUN 38.17 34.99 17.64 28.09 36.17 27.71 5.43 48.50 9.83 - 45.36 




B. ILLUSTRATION OF THE TRAFFIC ENGINEERING MODEL 
With the network topology of the Abilene network and the derived O-D demand 
matrix in Table 2, we can now use the traffic engineering model to determine the optimal 
plan for the NSP to route the traffic demands to maximize its profits. We assume that the 
capacity of each arc is 10 Gbps. We also assume that the marginal revenue for each Gbps 
of demand satisfied is $50. 
With the input parameters, the solution to the traffic engineering problem 
indicates that the maximum profit achieved is $1743.30. With the marginal revenue at 
$50 for each Gbps of demand satisfied, we know that all the demand is satisfied, since the 
total demand from all the nodes is 34.866 Gbps. 
In order to help in understanding the result outputs, we use several visualization 
and interpretation aids, namely the Network Utilization Graph, the Demand Satisfaction 
Matrix, and the Arc Utilization Matrix. 
1. Network Utilization Graph 
We incorporate visual enhancements to the graphical representation of the 
network topology to create the Network Utilization Graph. The thickness of each arc 
scales proportionally to represent the capacity of that arc. The color (shade) of the arc 
represents the utilization on the arc. Utilization on an arc is the ratio of the sum of all 
flows through that arc to the capacity of that arc. A darker shade represents a higher 
utilization. The size of each node scales with the population of the respective city the 
node represents and the position of the nodes represent the relative location of the nodes. 
These enhancements help us to quickly identify the relative capacities of the arcs and also 
the extent the capacities are used in the arcs, together with information on the relative 
populations and relative positions of the nodes. 
The Network Utilization Graph based on the results from traffic engineering is 
shown in Figure 2.  The capacities of all the existing arcs are the same at 10 Gbps, hence 
they appear to have the same thickness. It can be seen that SUN has the smallest 
population. We see that the arc utilization is high on HOU-KSC, ATL-WDC and NYC-
WDC, while DEN-SEA, SEA-SUN and ATL-IND have relatively low utilization. 
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Figure 2.   The Network Utilization Graph representation of the results of traffic 
engineering. The utilization of DEN-SEA, SEA-SUN and ATL-DEN is 
relatively low compared to the other arcs. 
  
 21
2. Demand Satisfaction Matrix 
The Demand Satisfaction Matrix shows in matrix form the proportion of demand 
for each O-D node pair that is satisfied by the network. The matrix helps us to identify 
quickly the extent of demand satisfaction for all the node-pairs.  
The Demand Satisfaction Matrix based on the results of traffic engineering is in 
Figure 3.  We observe that all of the demands are satisfied. 
 
Figure 3.   Demand Satisfaction Matrix showing results of traffic engineering. The 
demands for all O-D node-pairs are fully satisfied.  
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3. Arc Utilization Matrix 
The Arc Utilization Matrix presents numerically in matrix form for each arc the 
ratio of the sum of all flows through that arc to the capacity of that arc. A value of 1 
indicates that the arc is at capacity and saturated, while a value of 0 indicates that there is 
no flow over that arc even though there is capacity on the arc. Where an entry is blank, it 
means that the arc does not exist at all. The Arc Utilization Matrix complements the 
Network Utilization Graph by giving a more precise numerical indication of the 
utilization of the arcs. 
The Arc Utilization Matrix from the traffic engineering results is shown in Figure 
4.  We observe that ATL-WDC, HOU-KSC and NYC-WDC are utilized fully. 
 
Figure 4.   Arc Utilization Matrix for results of traffic engineering. Shaded entries 
indicate that the arcs are saturated. Other non-blank entries indicate the 




C. NETWORK PROVISIONING BASED ON ABILENE NODES 
With the existing Abilene network as a basis, we now look into how to build a 
network from scratch, as in the case of a new NSP coming into the market. This can be 
implemented by using the Network Provisioning model with the initial capacities of all 
arcs set to zero. 
Although a NSP might desire a fully connected network with infinite capacity, 
there are many reasons why this is not possible in practice. First of all, there are costs 
associated with building each arc, and the total cost of building the arcs cannot exceed the 
limited amount of budget. Even if the NSP has a sufficiently large budget, it will only 
spend up to the amount needed to build arcs that satisfy all the profitable demand. 
Specifically, the costs of building on the arcs in the path required for a unit of commodity 
cannot exceed the revenue associated with delivering that unit of commodity; otherwise, 
the NSP will be making a loss on that commodity. Finally, each arc can have a limit on 
how much capacity can be built. In the case where there the desired traffic is greater than 
the maximum capacity, the excess flow will have to be re-directed along other arcs on 
alternative economically profitable paths to the destination. 
We consider first the case where the fixed cost of building an arc is zero, before 
moving into cases where there are fixed costs. 
1. Case 1: Building a New Network with Zero Fixed Costs 
We first look into the case where building any new arc does not incur any fixed 
costs. In the first portion of this study, we assume the revenue for each unit of O-D traffic 
delivered is uniform at $50. We assume the maximum capacity that can be built on each 
arc is 10 Gbps. We assume the variable cost per unit distance per unit capacity of each 
arc built is fixed at $1. This implies that between two arcs having the same capacity, the 
arc connecting cities that are farther apart will be more costly than the arc connecting 
cities that are closer together. We vary the budget allowed in each run.  
The resultant network topology and demand satisfaction matrix for given budget 
of $200, $400, $600, $800 and $1000, shown in Figure 5.  The corresponding arc 




























Figure 5.   Resultant Network Topology and Demand Satisfaction Matrix in Case 1, for 
given budget $200, $400, $600, $800 and $1000, when building a new 





Budget = $200 
 
Budget = $400 
 
Budget = $600 
 
Budget = $800 
 
Budget = $1000 
 
 
Figure 6.   Arc Utilization Matrix in Case 1, for given budget $200, $400, $600, $800 
and $1000, when building a new network with no fixed costs. 
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We see from Figure 5 that, as budget is increased, more of the demands will be 
satisfied. This is because the NSP is able to build and enhance the capacity of more arcs 
when there is more budget available. 
We also observe that in the absence of fixed costs, the NSP will build direct arcs 
between node s and node t to satisfy demand between the pair of nodes, as this direct arc 
represents the shortest path and hence the least costly path to build. 
We note from Figure 6 that the NSP fully utilizes the capacities of the arcs built. 
This makes economic sense as the NSP will not spend to increase capacity that will be 
left unused, since all the arcs are direct. 
We note that a budget of $883.924 facilitates the fulfillment of all demand. We 
see from the demand satisfaction matrices that at any given budget less than $883.924, at 
most two arcs, connecting across the same pair of nodes (arising from constraint NP6), 
are partially built. This indicates that the underlying principle in building the network is 
to concentrate on expanding the network to satisfy the demands between a pair of nodes 
before building to service the demands for another pair of nodes. 
Since the amount of capacity built for a pair of nodes is equal in both directions, 
from this point on, when we refer to the arcs of a node-pair, we refer to arcs of both 
directions. We also define the duplex demand of a node-pair as the total demand 
regardless of direction between the node-pair  
We now examine in detail the topology of the network when the budget given is 
relatively small in order to deduce how a NSP should decide which arcs to build. The 
resultant network topologies for values for the budget at $2, $6, $10, $15, $20 and $50 




Budget = $2 
 
Budget = $6 
 
Budget = $10 
 
Budget = $15 
 
Budget = $20 
 
Budget = $50 
Figure 7.    Resultant Network Topology for given budget $2, $6, $10, $15, $20 and 
$50, when building a new network with no fixed costs. 
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CHI-IND 0.476 50 2.572 2.572 47.428 1.224 1.224 
NYC-WDC 1.032 50 3.612 3.612 46.388 3.728 4.952 
LAX-SUN 0.078 50 5.427 5.427 44.573 0.423 5.375 
ATL-IND 0.082 50 6.355 6.355 43.645 0.521 5.896 
CHI-KSC 0.296 50 7.526 7.526 42.474 2.228 8.124 
IND-KSC 0.082 50 8.46 8.46 41.540 0.694 8.818 
ATL-CHI 0.296 50 8.86 8.86 41.140 2.623 11.440 
ATL-WDC 0.062 50 9.028 9.028 40.972 0.560 12.000 
IND-WDC 0.098 50 9.272 9.272 40.728 0.909 12.909 
HOU-KSC 0.226 50 9.371 9.371 40.629 2.118 15.026 
SEA-SUN 0.012 50 9.83 9.83 40.170 0.118 15.144 
DEN-KSC 0.062 50 10.159 10.159 39.841 0.630 15.774 
CHI-WDC 0.356 50 11.04 11.04 38.960 3.930 19.705 
ATL-HOU 0.226 50 11.533 11.533 38.467 2.606 22.311 
ATL-KSC 0.052 50 11.758 11.758 38.242 0.611 22.922 
IND-NYC 1.376 50 12.334 12.334 37.666 16.972 39.894 
ATL-NYC 0.86 50 12.637 12.637 37.363 10.868 50.762 
HOU-IND 0.36 50 13.331 13.331 36.669 4.799 55.561 
DEN-HOU 0.27 50 13.648 13.648 36.352 3.685 59.246 
CHI-NYC 4.988 50 13.717 13.717 36.283 68.420 127.666 
LAX-SEA 0.466 50 14.071 14.071 35.929 6.557 134.223 
CHI-HOU 1.306 50 14.199 14.199 35.801 18.544 152.767 
DEN-LAX 0.466 50 14.729 14.729 35.271 6.864 159.631 
CHI-DEN 0.356 50 17.354 17.354 32.646 6.178 165.809 
DEN-SUN 0.012 50 17.639 17.639 32.361 0.212 166.021 
KSC-WDC 0.062 50 17.686 17.686 32.314 1.097 167.117 
DEN-IND 0.098 50 18.6 18.6 31.400 1.823 168.940 
DEN-SEA 0.074 50 19.055 19.055 30.945 1.410 170.350 
HOU-WDC 0.27 50 20.35 20.35 29.650 5.495 175.845 
KSC-NYC 0.86 50 20.791 20.791 29.209 17.880 193.725 
ATL-DEN 0.062 50 21.34 21.34 28.660 1.323 195.048 
HOU-LAX 1.712 50 23.388 23.388 26.612 40.040 235.088 
HOU-NYC 3.784 50 23.944 23.944 26.056 90.604 325.692 
KSC-LAX 0.39 50 24.286 24.286 25.714 9.472 335.164 
KSC-SUN 0.01 50 27.712 27.712 22.288 0.277 335.441 
DEN-WDC 0.074 50 27.845 27.845 22.155 2.061 337.502 
HOU-SUN 0.046 50 28.092 28.092 21.908 1.292 338.794 
KSC-SEA 0.062 50 28.753 28.753 21.247 1.783 340.576 
DEN-NYC 1.032 50 30.907 30.907 19.093 31.896 372.472 
CHI-LAX 2.256 50 31.766 31.766 18.234 71.664 444.137 
HOU-SEA 0.27 50 32.122 32.122 17.878 8.673 452.809 
IND-LAX 0.622 50 32.649 32.649 17.351 20.308 473.117 
ATL-LAX 0.39 50 33.981 33.981 16.019 13.253 486.370 
CHI-SUN 0.06 50 34.993 34.993 15.007 2.100 488.469 
CHI-SEA 0.356 50 35.092 35.092 14.908 12.493 500.962 
IND-SUN 0.016 50 36.172 36.172 13.828 0.579 501.541 
IND-SEA 0.098 50 36.848 36.848 13.152 3.611 505.152 
ATL-SUN 0.01 50 38.167 38.167 11.833 0.382 505.534 
ATL-SEA 0.062 50 40.315 40.315 9.685 2.500 508.033 
LAX-WDC 0.466 50 41.652 41.652 8.348 19.410 527.443 
LAX-NYC 6.538 50 44.944 44.944 5.056 293.844 821.287 
SUN-WDC 0.012 50 45.357 45.357 4.643 0.544 821.831 
SEA-WDC 0.074 50 46.07 46.07 3.930 3.409 825.240 
NYC-SUN 0.172 50 48.502 48.502 1.498 8.342 833.583 
NYC-SEA 1.032 50 48.78 48.78 1.220 50.341 883.924 
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We observe from Figure 7 that the resultant networks are nested, meaning that 
arcs built under a given budget will also be built when the budget allocated is higher. To 
explain this, we refer to Table 4, the list of data of the node-pairs in Case 1. The marginal 
revenue is the revenue earned per unit of commodity delivered, which is st . Likewise, 
the marginal cost is the cost per unit commodity for building on arcs in the path to deliver 
that commodity, and is equal to 
( , ) ( , )
ij







 . The marginal profit is calculated from 
subtracting the marginal cost from the marginal revenue. In particular, we bring to 
attention that the data is sorted according to decreasing marginal profit. The Cumulative 
Cost indicates the sum of the cost of building the arc to fully satisfy its demand, and the 
cost of all other arcs with higher marginal profits. 
When the budget given is $2, the two arcs built are CHI-IND and NYC-WDC. 
This corresponds to the two arcs with the shortest distances in Table 4.  The demand for 
CHI-IND is completely fulfilled while the demand for NYC-WDC is partially fulfilled. 
Examining the cumulative cost of fully building these two shortest arcs, we see a 
corresponding relation that a budget of $2 is sufficient to build on CHI-IND, the shortest 
arc, to fully satisfy the demand of this node-pair, and build on NYC-WDC to partially 
satisfy that demand. 
When the budget given is $6, three more arcs are built – LAX-SUN, ATL-IND 
and CHI-KSC. This again corresponds with the node-pairs with the next three shortest 
distances. 
We see the same relationship pattern emerging from the rest of the cases seen in 
Figure 7.   
From this example, we see that the NSP builds arcs in the order of their distances. 
More precisely, the order to build is based on the marginal profit, starting from the 
highest. 
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2. Case 1a: Building a New Network with Zero Fixed Costs, with 
Variation of Revenue 
In Case 1, we observe that when given a sufficiently large budget, all demands 
between the nodes will be serviced. However, this is based on the premise that there is 
profit to be reaped from servicing the demand of a node-pair. We now demonstrate this 
condition by lowering the marginal revenue. 
We now decrease the marginal revenue from $50/Gbps to $48/Gbps, while 
allocating a sufficiently large budget of $2000. The demand satisfaction matrix of the 
resulting network is shown in Figure 8.  The corresponding marginal revenue, marginal 
cost and the marginal profits for the node-pairs are shown in Table 5.  From the demand 
satisfaction matrix, it can be seen that the traffic between NYC-SEA and NYC-SUN is 
dropped. This is because the marginal revenue, at $48/Gbps, is less than the marginal 
costs for building on NYC-SEA and NYC-SUN, meaning that it is not profitable for the 
NSP to provide service for the demands of these node-pairs.  
 
 
Figure 8.   Demand Satisfaction Matrix when per-unit revenue ( st ) is $48/Gbps. Note 
that demands for NYC-SEA and NYC-SUN are not satisfied at all. 
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Table 5.   Tabulation of Marginal Revenue, Marginal Cost and Marginal Profit for 
each City-Pair under Case 1a. Note that the Marginal Profit for NYC-SUN 













CHI-IND 48 2.572 45.428  HOU-WDC 48 20.35 27.65 
NYC-WDC 48 3.612 44.388  KSC-NYC 48 20.791 27.209 
LAX-SUN 48 5.427 42.573  ATL-DEN 48 21.34 26.66 
ATL-IND 48 6.355 41.645  HOU-LAX 48 23.388 24.612 
CHI-KSC 48 7.526 40.474  HOU-NYC 48 23.944 24.056 
IND-KSC 48 8.46 39.54  KSC-LAX 48 24.286 23.714 
ATL-CHI 48 8.86 39.14  KSC-SUN 48 27.712 20.288 
ATL-WDC 48 9.028 38.972  DEN-WDC 48 27.845 20.155 
IND-WDC 48 9.272 38.728  HOU-SUN 48 28.092 19.908 
HOU-KSC 48 9.371 38.629  KSC-SEA 48 28.753 19.247 
SEA-SUN 48 9.83 38.17  DEN-NYC 48 30.907 17.093 
DEN-KSC 48 10.159 37.841  CHI-LAX 48 31.766 16.234 
CHI-WDC 48 11.04 36.96  HOU-SEA 48 32.122 15.878 
ATL-HOU 48 11.533 36.467  IND-LAX 48 32.649 15.351 
ATL-KSC 48 11.758 36.242  ATL-LAX 48 33.981 14.019 
IND-NYC 48 12.334 35.666  CHI-SUN 48 34.993 13.007 
ATL-NYC 48 12.637 35.363  CHI-SEA 48 35.092 12.908 
HOU-IND 48 13.331 34.669  IND-SUN 48 36.172 11.828 
DEN-HOU 48 13.648 34.352  IND-SEA 48 36.848 11.152 
CHI-NYC 48 13.717 34.283  ATL-SUN 48 38.167 9.833 
LAX-SEA 48 14.071 33.929  ATL-SEA 48 40.315 7.685 
CHI-HOU 48 14.199 33.801  LAX-WDC 48 41.652 6.348 
DEN-LAX 48 14.729 33.271  LAX-NYC 48 44.944 3.056 
CHI-DEN 48 17.354 30.646  SUN-WDC 48 45.357 2.643 
DEN-SUN 48 17.639 30.361  SEA-WDC 48 46.07 1.93 
KSC-WDC 48 17.686 30.314  NYC-SUN 48 48.502 -0.502 
DEN-IND 48 18.6 29.4  NYC-SEA 48 48.78 -0.78 
DEN-SEA 48 19.055 28.945      
 
Continuing this experiment to the other extreme, when the per-unit revenue is 
only $5/Gbps, only CHI-IND and NYC-WDC are profitable and will be serviced by the 
NSP.  
3. A Heuristic Derived from Case 1 and Case 1a 
From the results in Case 1 and Case 1a, we can infer that the optimal solution 
resembles the heuristic greedy algorithm. The NSP will build direct arcs, starting from 
that with the highest marginal profit. The NSP will continue increasing the capacity of 
that arc until the demand for that node-pair is satisfied. The NSP will then start to build 
on increasing the capacity of the arcs that gives the next highest marginal profit until the 
demand for that node-pair is also satisfied. This is repeated as long as the NSP has budget 
to continue building until there are no longer any profitable demands. A pre-condition to 
this heuristic is that the demand does not exceed the maximum allowable capacity. 
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4. Case 2: Building a New Network with Fixed Costs for New Edges 
We next consider the case where there are fixed costs associated with building 
each new edge. Figure 9 shows the network topology and demand satisfaction matrix 




























Figure 9.   Resultant Network Topology and Demand Satisfaction Matrix for given 
budget $200, $400, $600, $800 and $1000, when building a new network 
with fixed costs of $5. 
With a fixed cost of $5 per arc, we observe that a budget of $1000 yields a 
network in which not all demands are satisfied. Specifically, demand between NYC-SEA 
and SEA-WDC is not fulfilled, and SUN is not connected to the network. 
In the following two sections, we investigate the reasons for these observations, 
and through the variation of input parameters, attempt to address the observations. 
5. Case 2a: Building a New Network with Fixed Costs for New Edges, 
with Variation of Revenue for NYC-SEA and SEA-WDC 
We first investigate why demand for NYC-SEA and SEA-WDC is not fulfilled 
when the given budget is $1000, by examining the distances of the shortest paths along 
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the built arcs between NYC-SEA and SEA-WDC. We refer to the network topology 
graph for given budget of $1000 in Figure 9.   
The shortest path from between SEA and WDC is SEA-LAX-HOU-ATL-WDC, 
with a path distance of 58.02 units. This relates to a marginal cost of $58.02/Gbps for 
delivering commodity SEA-WDC, which is less than the marginal revenue of $50/Gbps. 
Hence, this demand for SEA-WDC is not serviced. 
The shortest path from between SEA and NYC is SEA-LAX-DEN-KSC-CHI-
NYC, with a path distance of 60.202 units. This relates to a marginal cost of 
$60.202/Gbps for delivering commodity SEA-NYC, which is less than the marginal 
revenue of $50/Gbps. Hence, this demand for SEA-NYC is also not serviced. 
Next, we run Case 2 with a budget of $2000 and have the marginal revenue for 
SEA-WDC be $60/Gbps instead of $50/Gbps. Since this marginal revenue is greater that 
the marginal cost, we expect demand for SEA-WDC to be fulfilled. The resulting demand 
satisfaction matrix in Figure 10 confirms this to be the case. 
 
 
Figure 10.   Demand Satisfaction Matrix when marginal revenue for NYC-WDC is 
increased to $60/Gbps. The demand between SEA and WDC in the case is 
all fulfilled. 
 36
Next, we similarly increase the marginal revenue for SEA-NYC from $50/Gbps to 
$60/Gbps. Based purely on the marginal cost of building along the shortest existing path 
between SEA and NYC, we do not expect to demand for SEA-NYC to be fulfilled, since 
the marginal cost at $60.202/Gbps is still greater than the marginal revenue. The results 
for this case, in Figure 11, however show otherwise. 
 
Resultant Network Demand Satisfaction Matrix 
  
Figure 11.   Resultant Network Topology and Demand Satisfaction Matrix when 
marginal revenue for NYC-SEA is increased to 60. Note that the arc 
between SEA and CHI is built, and demand for NYC-SEA and SEA-WDC 
is now all fulfilled. 
The interesting result is that although the marginal revenue of $60/Gbps does not 
cover the marginal cost of $60.202/Gbps for expanding the capacity of the pre-existing 
shortest path for SEA-NYC, the revenue is enough to compensate for the fixed costs of 
building the direct arc between SEA and CHI. This also benefits the flow of commodity 
SEA-WDC as the shortest path for this commodity is now SEA-CHI-IND-WDC, with a 
path distance of 46.936 units. In this case, the marginal revenue at $50/Gbps for SEA-
WDC is now more than the marginal cost; hence we see the demand for this commodity 
fulfilled completely. 
Previously, all commodity flows in and out of SEA must pass through LAX, the 
only node connected to SEA. With the new arc SEA-CHI built, some of the commodities 
will find more economical to pass through CHI instead. The flows from SEA when SEA-
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CHI is built are shown in Figure 12.  We observe that the NSP benefits from the lower 
marginal costs for commodities between CHI-SEA, IND-SEA, NYC-SEA and SEA-
WDC, which outweighs the fixed cost of building arc CHI-SEA. 
 
Figure 12.   Network flows for commodities originating from SEA. Note that with arc 
SEA-CHI built, commodities from SEA to CHI, IND, WDC and NYC now 
need not pass through LAX. 
6. Case 2b: Building a New Network with Fixed Cost for New Edges, 
with Population Increase for SUN 
We now proceed to increase the population of SUN to illustrate that one way for 
SUN to be “worthwhile” to the NSP is to increase the customer population of SUN 
beyond a critical population mass. When the population of SUN is small, it does not 
make sense to service the demands to and from SUN. A critical population mass is 
required to overcome the associated fixed costs to add an arc connecting to SUN. When 
the population of SUN is increased, the corresponding O-D demand matrix derived from 
the gravity model changes, with entries involving SUN increasing in demand.  
Figure 13 shows the resultant network topologies and demand satisfaction 
matrices when we allow the NSP a sufficiently large budget of $2000, and consider 
























Figure 13.   Resultant Network Topology and Demand Satisfaction Matrix for Case 2b. 
SUN will be connected to the network if its population increases by at least 
60%. 
We observe that when the population of SUN increases to 60%, it crosses the 
critical mass where it is economically viable built arcs from SUN to fulfill some of the 
demands associated with SUN. Note that none of the demands between SUN-NYC are 
fulfilled as the marginal cost of building along the shortest path between SUN and NYC, 




Another observation of interest is that the flow of commodity SEA-SUN is not via 
a direct arc, but instead passes through LAX as an intermediate node. When there are 
fixed costs to build a new arc, it may be cheaper to enhance the existing capacities along 
the arcs along the shortest built path. 
The distance of this path SEA-LAX-SUN is 19.498 units, while the distance of 
SEA-SUN is 9.83 units. The total demand for SEA-SUN is 0.02 Gbps. The cost of 
provisioning on existing arcs on path SEA-LAX-SUN to fulfill all demand for 
commodity SEA-SUN is $0.38996, and this is less than the revenue of $1 (= 0.02 x $50) 
from fulfilling all that demand. The cost of building new direct arcs SEA-SUN to fulfill 
all demand for the same commodity is $0.1966 plus the fixed cost of 5 for each direction 
of the link, leading to the total cost of $10.1966 which will cause the NSP to incur losses 
delivering this commodity this way.  
7. A Network Provisioning Decision Rule 
In order to service the unfulfilled demand for a particular commodity ( , )s t , the 
NSP has to decide whether to enhance the capacity of the existing arcs in the network or 
to build a new arc ( , )s t . To help with this decision, we refer to the marginal costs for 
each option. 
We make use of the same definitions for parameters specified in Chapter III.  We 
assume that ij is the same for all arcs ( , )i j , hence for notational convenience, we drop 
the subscripts in this section.  
The lowest marginal cost for enhancing the capacity of the existing arcs comes 
from the marginal costs ( existingMC ) of enhancing arcs along the shortest path from source 
to destination for the commodity. The distance along this shortest path is shortestPathd . 
Based on our cost model, we have existing shortestPathMC d . 
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The marginal cost for the new direct arc ( _new arcMC ) depends on both the arc 
length, and the fixed cost divided by the capacity built to service the unfulfilled demand. 




  . 
When _existing new arcMC MC , the NSP should build the direct link, otherwise, the 
NSP should enhance the capacity along the existing shortest path. 
Based on this decision rule, we see that when there are no fixed costs ( 0  ), the 
new arc should be built, since the direct arc ( , )s t  will be the shortest distance path 
possible.  
With all other parameters held constant, as the fixed cost increases, _new arcMC  
increases, and the NSP will be inclined to build on the existing shortest path. Conversely, 
if the capacity to be built increases arising from higher demand, the fixed cost is spread 
over the increased capacity built ( stY ), and this decreases _new arcMC . 
We illustrate this by contrasting the resultant network topology at various levels 
of fixed cost in Figure 14.  We observe that at 40  , the nodes that remain connected 
are those of the five largest cities (NYC, LAX, CHI, HOU and IND). By extension, the 
demand between these nodes are also the largest, hence there are sufficiently large flows 





0   10   
20   40   
Figure 14.   Resultant topologies at 0,10,20,40  . Note that as  increases, more 
nodes will be disconnected from the network, and node-pairs with the 
highest demands will continue to be serviced. 
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In this thesis, we model the decisions of the NSP, whose aim is to maximize its 
profit, through the traffic engineering model and the network provisioning model. The 
NSP decides how to link the nodes and how to route commodities through the resultant 
network to derive maximum profit. Under different cost structures, revenues, budget 
allocation and the demand for commodities, the resultant networks are different. 
We make use of the Abilene dataset as input to the network provisioning model 
and consider the case of a new NSP who is building up a new network. We then examine 
the resultant networks to identify the underlying logic. 
Our model include two types of costs: fixed costs for building new arcs and 
variable costs for adding capacity to the arcs. In the case where there are no fixed costs 
associated with building new arcs, we see that flows of commodities are through direct 
arcs, which are the least costly to build to transport the commodities. We also identify 
that the priority is to build arcs to satisfy the demand of the commodity with the greatest 
marginal profit. If the marginal profit for a commodity is negative, the direct arc will not 
be built. This gives a simple greedy algorithm heuristic.  
When we introduce fixed costs, the flows of commodities are no longer 
necessarily via direct arcs. Even when the fixed costs are low, we observe that there are 
commodities that are not transported even though the network has capacity to do so. 
Some cities might be ignored, even when there is budget to service them. By increasing 
the marginal revenue for the unfulfilled demand, we can make it profitable for the NSP to 
service that demand. We also illustrate a case where increasing marginal revenue leads to 
a new network construction that also reduces the costs of servicing other demands. 
Through increasing the population of the disconnected node, we demonstrate that there 
exists a threshold or critical population mass before it becomes economically viable for 
the NSP to build arcs to that node. 
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We generalize the results in a network provisioning decision rule that provides a 
simple heuristic of constructing the NSP’s network. We observe that when fixed costs get 
higher, more nodes will be disconnected and nodes with larger populations tend to remain 
connected. 
B. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
This thesis assumes a static set of nodes of which the NSP bases its decisions on 
over a single time period. A possible area of future research will be to gradually increase 
the set of nodes over a multi-time period model to determine how the increasing set of 
nodes will affect decisions on network expansion.  
The marginal revenues in this thesis give rise to a linear revenue model, but we 
observe that changes in marginal revenue can lead to the adding and dropping of 
demands serviced by the NSP. By considering revenues which change with the amount of 
commodity delivered, the results could shed some light on the price differentiation or 
price discrimination that we observe in real-world networks.  
This thesis models the decisions of a single NSP in isolation. The natural next 
step is to model the interaction of multiple NSPs targeting the same pool of customers by 
considering, for example, the change in marginal revenue arising from the overall 
amounts of commodities delivered. 
  
 45
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Ahuja, R. K., Magnanti, T. L., & Orlin, J. B. (1993). Network flows: Theory, algorithms, 
and applications. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Alderson, D., Li, L., Willinger, W., & Doyle, J.C. (2005). Understanding Internet 
topology: Principles, models and validation. IEEE/ACM Transactions on 
Networking, 13(6), 1205–1218. 
Alderson, D.L. (2008). Catching the “Network Science” bug: Insight and opportunity for 
the operations researcher. Operations Research, 56(5), 1047–1065. 
Barabási, A.-L., & Albert, R. (1999). Emergence of scaling in random networks. Science, 
286(5439), 509–512. 
Corbo J., & Parkes, D. (2005). The price of selfish behavior in bilateral network 
formation. Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on 
Principles of Distributed Computing (pp. 99–107) New York, NY: ACM Press. 
Derosier, J. A. (2008). Internet topology generation based on reverse-engineered design 
principles: Performance tradeoffs between heuristic and optimization-based 
approaches (Master’s thesis). Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
Dorogovtsev, S.N., & Goltsev, A.V. (2008). Critical phenomena in complex networks. 
Review of Modern Physics, 80(4), 1275–1335. 
Economides, N. (2007). The Internet and network economics. In Brousseau, E., & 
Curien, N. (Eds.), Internet and Digital Economics (pp  239–267). Cambridge, 
U.K.: Cambridge University Press. 
Fabrikant, A., Luthra, A., Maneva, E., Papadimitriou, C. H., & Shenker, S. (2003). On a 
network creation game. Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM 
symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (pp. 347–351) New York, 
NY: ACM Press. 
Forsgren, A., & Prytz M. (2006). Telecommunications network design. In Resende, M. 
C. G., & Pardalos, P. M. (Eds.), Handbook of optimization in telecommunications. 
(pp. 269–290). New York, NY: Springer. 
GAMS Development Corporation. (2011). General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) 
(Version 23.6) [Software]. Available from http://www.gams.com/ 
Lederer, P. J., & Nambimadom, R. S. (1998). Airline network design. Operations 
Research, 46(6), 785–804. 
 46
McPherson, D. B. (2009). A contrasting look at network formation models and their 
application to the minimum spanning tree (Master’s thesis). Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA. 
Newman, M.E.J. (2003). The structure and function of complex networks. SIAM Review, 
45(2), 167–256. 
Newman, M., Barabási, A.-L., & Watts, D.J. (2006). The structure and dynamics of 
networks. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Odlyzko A. M. (2004). The evolution of price discrimination in transportation and its 
implications for the Internet. Review of Network Economics, 3(3), 323–346. 
Qwest. (2011). Detailed information about the Abilene Network on the Qwest website. 
Retrieved November 1, 2011, from 
http://www.qwest.com/about/qwest/internet2/abilene.html 
Resende, M. C. G., & Pardalos, P. M. (2006). Handbook of optimization in 
telecommunications. New York, NY: Springer. 
Roughan, M. (2005). Simplifying the synthesis of Internet traffic matrices. SIGCOMM 
Computer Communications Review, 35(5), 93–96. 
Sanchez A. (2010). Internet service provider network evolution in the presence of 
changing environmental conditions (Master’s thesis). Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA. 
Tardos, É., & Wexler, T. (2007). Network formation games and the potential function 
method. In Nisan, N., Roughgarden, T., Tardos, E., & Vazirani, V. V. (Eds.), 
Algorithmic Game Theory. (pp. 485–511). New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press.  
U.S. Census Bureau. (2011). Detailed information on city population. Retrieved 
November 1, 2011, from http://www.census.gov/ 
Willinger, W., Alderson, D. & Doyle, J.C. (2009). Mathematics and the Internet: A 
source of enormous confusion and great potential. Notices of the American 
Mathematical Society, 56(5), 586–599. 
Zhang, Z.-L., Nabipay, P., Odlyzko A., & Guerin, R. (2010). Interaction, competition and 
innovation in a service-oriented Internet: An economic model. INFOCOM 2010 
proceedings IEEE. (pp. 1–5). 
  
 47
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
3. Professor David L. Alderson 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
4. Professor Nedialko B. Dimitrov 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
5. Professor Yeo Tat Soon 
Temasek Defence Systems Institute 
Singapore 
 
6. Ms Tan Lai Poh 
Temasek Defence Systems Institute  
Singapore 
  
